Showing posts with label college admission. Show all posts
Showing posts with label college admission. Show all posts

Friday, June 5, 2015

College degree

My snide summary of marketing is, "Find people who are willing to pay more, then charge them more." Searching on a specific airline's website is an indicator that you are willing to pay more, so it costs more to buy directly from the airline than from an aggregator. Buying shampoo at the salon is an indicator you are willing to pay more. My favorite example: premium gas. It is not actually better for your car; it just costs more.

How about a college degree?

Certain selective colleges have managed to distinguish themselves as "worth more." Parchment has an innovative method for divining applicants' perception of schools' worth. They treated each applicant's decision as votes. For example, a student who got into Columbia, Duke, and Stanford and chose Stanford votes for Stanford and against Columbia and Duke. Parchment compiled all these votes using an Elo method to determine which colleges have distinguished themselves in applicants' minds.

How the schools managed to distinguish themselves is a great question. Many did it through their age - our oldest colleges are often the most esteemed. Others did it through the reputation of their graduate schools. Sports catapulted other schools onto the scene. However, selectivity in admissions is the key variable. Maybe it is because U.S. News and World Report's college ranking method weights selectivity so highly, but even without the U.S. News rankings, selectivity would definitely affect people's perceptions. (Side note: the rankings seriously distort college's behavior.) People assume hard-to-obtain goods are worth more.

Are these schools, in fact, worth more?


In terms of the content of the courses, there is probably little difference. For the most part, a course in differential equations at Yale covers about the same topics at about the same pace as one at Ohio State. It is important to understand that most college courses are not special snowflakes but (cough) commodities. Of course, college professors do invent new courses, and there are programs unique to an individual school. But many courses are commodities. One may get a better or worse teacher, but because schools don't place much weight on teaching in professors' evaluations, teacher quality and school reputation don't have much correlation.

Of course, course content and teaching is not the only variable that matters when talking about institution educational quality. Two colleges might teach similar courses but at differing levels of effectiveness. Good institutions have professors who keep standards for student work high; good institutions give robust support to weaker students; and good institutions develop new programs. Furthermore, due to the enormous endowments highly selective colleges have, they have a lot more money to spend per student - although much of the extra funding goes to facilities like dorms, athletic buildings, and student recreation centers that have little impact on the quality of instruction and to research facilities that may have only a small impact on undergraduate instruction. However, institutional quality hardly seems to justify the hysteria.

One could argue that there are intangible benefits to going to a high-reputation school like being surrounded by motivated, smart students and professors. While this has makes intuitive sense, the best evidence does not really support this argument. The C.L.A., the Collegiate Learning Assessment, shows little pattern between college attended and student learning. Some learn a lot at lower reputation schools; some learn little at high-reputation schools. One can discuss Shakespeare with other smart, eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds, but the discussion could be more enlightening if it includes a working mom who's back in college, a soldier who's back from war, ... you get my point. The student body argument cuts both ways; diversity is important, too. The C.L.A. results show that neither way is intrinsically superior. How much or how little students learn has everything to do with them and little to do with the college itself.

A giant meta-analysis entitled How College Affects Students wrote:

"The great majority of postsecondary institutions appear to have surprisingly similar net impacts on student growth. If there is one thing that characterizes the research on between-college effects on the acquisition of subject matter knowledge and academic skills, it is that in the most internally valid studies, even the statistically significant effects tend to be quite small and often trivial in magnitude."

Quoted from the New York Times. And the New York Times continues:

The whole apparatus of selective college admissions is designed to deliberately confuse things that exist with things that don't. Many of the most prestigious colleges are an order of magnitude wealthier and more selective than the typical university. These are the primary factors driving their annual rankings at or near the top of the U.S. News list of "best" colleges. The implication is that the differences in the quality of education they provide are of a similar size. There is no evidence to suggest that this is remotely true. When college leaders talk about academic standards, they often mean admissions standards, not standards for what happens in classrooms themselves.

Of course, that's about learning. Let's talk about earning.

Advantages of reputation


This leaves reputation alone as the way in which high-reputation colleges are worth more. Reputation means whether the degree will open the door to good entry-level jobs in a field and get a person off to a great start. And the evidence is that the path to many elite jobs runs through high-reputation colleges almost exclusively. Why are many elite employers so enamored of a few colleges?

Let's admit that the undergraduate degree itself does not convey much information about what a person learned. We may assume that a computer science major covered certain basics in the course of earning his or her degree. But that's about it. The degree provides low-quality information about how deeply that person learned in college. (In fact, it is basically impossible to fail out of a high-reputation college - they don't want to ruin their statistics.)  So why do businesses care about the undergraduate institution? The simple answer must be that the key information is about college admission. Businesses must believe that high-reputation colleges do a good job selecting the smartest and hardest-working students.

In some fields like law, the college (and law school) a person attended are always crucially important to hiring decisions. In other fields like computer science, the potential employers care far more about work samples and portfolios. While it is hard to make generalizations, for most fields, the reality is more like law. For many entry-level jobs, employers would be hard-pressed to come up with suitable work samples recent college graduates could submit, thus employers default to college reputation. Especially for the entry-level jobs that lead to elite jobs, employers recruit heavily - almost exclusively - from high-reputation schools, many going so far as to have dedicated H.R. teams for each school or special recruiting events. There are substantial employment advantages to going to an elite college in the person's initial job search that could have life-long effects. Once someone is shut out of this kind of entry-level job, it is hard to gain the experience to ever be considered for the culminating elite job.

The reputation of a college helps with starting a person out on the career path. A good start could have long-term financial benefits, so this might actually justify the reputation of some colleges as worth more. But my question is a different one. If what businesses are really getting is admission information, is this useful information? Are businesses right to think colleges are doing a good job selecting students?

Admission decisions


On the one hand, one can say colleges are selecting those students who are smart and hard-working - good traits for employers to seek. Let's stipulate that employers want to maximize both as much as possible; they want new employees with loads of content knowledge who can think flexibly. I am not going to engage with any question about the social implications of affirmative action or other admission policy, important though those questions are. I am merely addressing the question: Would employers be right to assume that the better the reputation of the school, the smarter and harder working its graduates?

After reading Mitchell Steven's book, Creating a Class, I realized that the defining fact for college admission officers is the lack of information. Despite S.A.T. and A.P. scores and other objective information, a lot of learning that students do is invisible. Can the student learn on their own, or do his or her scores hide heavy tutoring? Softer skills - like managing intellectual disagreements and debates, grit, research skills, and integrity - are hidden. Letters of recommendation only go so far to fill in the information gap. Smart, hard-working students at schools with overworked teachers and college counselors are at a disadvantage because they may not get high-quality letters. As a result, admission officers may revert to proxies, such as the reputation of the high school. (If employers are relying on the reputation of the college as a proxy, and colleges are relying on the reputation of the high school as a proxy...) This is what Shaun Harper found: great students at weak schools are overlooked.

To be fair to admission officers, students at weaker high school might never write an analytical essay, while students at great high school write one or more a week. The high school program does matter, but my point is that there are some students who would be capable but are not given the opportunity because of their high school's weak curriculum. While standardized tests are not great equalizers, without them, admission to selective colleges would be even more skewed to students who go to the best high schools. S.A.T. scores and A.P. scores give colleges some assurance that a student is exceptional despite attending a weak high school - but not enough to level the field. Colleges are not scooping up many hidden gems because they simply lack the information to do so. On top of this, of the smart, hard-working first-generation college students and minority students who do get in, many do not end up matriculating. So, these students also lack information. The bottom line is that college admission is not only about intellectual and personal capabilities but also about social capital.

Steven Pinker, the celebrity linguist at Harvard, points out facts about college admissions at selective schools that should unnerve everyone. Selective schools use holistic selection including academics, extracurriculars, and character. This disadvantages very smart but poor students who cannot afford to be well-rounded. Furthermore, it means that the student body, once at Harvard or other selective schools, spends a lot of its time in the same extracurriculars that helped them get in, and not as much on academics as one might expect. As Dr. Pinker heard a Harvard admission officer point out, their goal is not to train future academians but future leaders. (Is the fact that so many Harvardians go into finance -- the lucrative but well-beaten path -- an indication of the admission office's failure?) It is hard to believe that the extracurriculars are really a great proxy of leadership. Not to pick on any one activity here, but would an employer actually care that a person is an outstanding rower? singer?

And the other shocking issue is students from China. Most high schools there do not have college counselors, so a third-party system of packagers help get students into colleges. And the degree of fraud is truly shocking: 90% fake recommendations, 70% fake essays, and 50% fake high school transcripts. Check out the huge five-part expose in Reuters about cheating on the international S.A.T. test dates. Despite this, U.S. colleges continue to admit Chinese students in mass without demanding changes to the system. They could require gao kao scores. They could demand video interviews to prove English skills. Given that they do not make such demands, and given that colleges know the fraud problem, then do you have much faith in any part of the admission process? Colleges admission work is not so precise and thorough to justify business faith in college graduates absent other data. In light of this, college admissions officers' rhetoric that they are skilled at picking the best and brightest should make us incredulous -- and the effect of it on students is especially insidious. The data are just not that trustworthy to justify such boasts. (I would also add in the T. M. Landry scam -- which had to be at least very, very suspicious to college admissions officers, yet no one even went through the cursory steps of checking up on their data.)

This is not a plea to go to a fully objective system where only standardized test scores count. One only needs to look at the gao kao to see the dangers. I think it is fine for colleges to have subjective opinions about potential students, just like it is fine for students to have subjective opinions about which colleges they like the best! This is why I argued in a previous post for a matching system. Instead, my plea is for two things: college admissions should drop the rhetoric of infallibility. Just admit that the college is looking for students who clear a certain benchmark and who fit. Second, businesses should recognize that college admission is a fuzzy science at best. Sure, one might value candidates from highly selective colleges more than those from semi-selective colleges, but making distinctions between Harvard grads and Vassar grads is folly.

Businesses have created a self-fulfilling prophecy. By esteeming some undergraduate institutions far more than others, they have reinforced the reputation of those schools and created an admissions rush for those schools. The weak link in the system is that college admission cannot make the sort of fine distinctions it is presumed to. One way to break the cycle would be to prohibit employers from campus recruiting events and from asking about a candidate's undergraduate institution, but I doubt that would catch on. However, it is interesting to think about how employers would be forced to deal with evaluating 22 year olds if they only knew that he or she had an undergraduate degree in a chemistry but could not ask about the institution. Would they ask more questions about what the candidate had actually learned?

These problems all stem from the relative paucity of information about college outcomes. At the top end, the lack of information creates a mad scramble for a few schools of sterling reputation. In the middle, many students at flagship states schools and solid private colleges have their excellence overlooked. At the bottom end, many students who are capable of getting into more selective schools do not bother. Nor do they realize how much their decisions matter financially, or even how to seek out financial aid successfully. Enter the Obama administration's proposal to create college rankings. Will that help combat the information desert that currently exists?

All prospective students, from top to bottom, care about two things: the quality of the education and the affordability. (Let's assume that college reputation is the current concern only because quality is so hard to assess currently. It's a very rare student who would choose something meaningless but prestigious. People always think other people do, however. Everyone likes to think he is the last idealist...) Would the proposed system address those issues?

Obama's college ratings


Obama has made a push for college ratings. They will largely eschew measures of quality, as it is so difficult to measure, and focus on graduation rates, affordability, and job prospects. One problem is that the schools that serve minority students, first-generation college students, and working students will by definition have lower graduation rates and unfortunately weaker job prospects. (While individual students might be improving their own prospects substantially, students at these schools as a group have weaker prospects than those for students attending more selective schools - a college degree knocks down some but not all barriers.) These schools may be doing a good job serving their students but get punished in the ratings, creating perverse incentives to not admit higher-risk students. It is worth including a social mobility score (i.e., SES diversity) in the rankings, which can help ensure colleges are compared to like-schools.

Graduation rates are relatively simple to compare. Instead of reporting the percentage of students who are done after six years, colleges should report median years until graduation (maybe also the 75th and 90th percentile years until graduation). Schools could be lumped into categories based on social mobility scores (perhaps six categories or so - all the most selective schools would go into one category, by the way) and compared against peer schools. Students could see whether one school is dramatically worse than its peers - maybe indicating that the school puts too little effort into counseling. Or the more mathematically accurate way would be to use a regression. Based on a college's student population demographics, schools could be ranked on the difference between what is the expected from the regression vs. the actual graduation rates.

What about affordability? First of all, the actual price, not the sticker price, ought to be used, so scholarships and other discounts ought to be factored in, plus the length of time it actually takes to complete the degree, and books. The other complication is boarding. Commuter schools need to be separated into a separate category. However, it is well worth the effort: giving simple prices to students would be a huge help to many first-generation college students! The hard part is that what people really care about is not the total cost of the degree but the cost compared to the expected earnings - so now we are talking about a combined metric. How about time to repay student loans at median earnings? This factors in the actual price of the degree and expected earnings, combining them into a number people can easily process: how long one will spend repaying loans, if the total cost is entirely borrowed. Twenty years repaying loans will be a sobering number for a lot of prospective students.

How is this data on earnings to be collected? Presumably, the federal government could track this through taxes (I would not trust the colleges too), although there are privacy issues with this tracking. The bigger statistical headache is people who are not working because of illness or injury, marriage, or graduate school. Skipping over these people could distort the earnings data considerably for some schools! This leads us to the other, biggest headache: different majors. Perhaps earnings data should be broken out by school by major or maybe by professional field people eventually go into: (1) math, computer science, natural science, and engineering; (2) business; (3) education, social work, and counseling; (4) humanities, journalism, and arts; (5) medicine; and (6) law. The school ratings might list years to repay full cost for graduates working in each of those fields. Job satisfaction and ability to find jobs in their desired field could be given a score too. There could be separate but similar questions for students who go to graduate school about whether they are happy with the graduate school they got into.

Social mobility / mission


Of course, the social mobility score is necessary to rate schools properly in different categories. And the federal government spends so much money on subsidizing loans, many loans should be going to schools that help students move up in society. It is worth it to report it explicitly. And it is worth reporting explicitly what fields graduates go into. Frankly, it is embarrassing how many Ivy League students go work on Wall Street. (Disclaimer: I went to an Ivy League undergraduate school.) If these students represent the best and the brightest, I would hope to see more in academic research, political leadership, social activism, education, and so on. It is not that surprising, but maybe seeing that fact given an explicit score, on a government webpage, will make some colleges recruit a little harder for people with an activist and not acquisitionist mindset. And it might make some qualified applicants who have no interest in consulting or finance think twice about going to an Ivy League school.

Of course, the federal government spends so much money on student loan subsidies that it could just decide to make every public university free. I think this might have a fascinating effect on the whole system judging from how university systems work in other countries. If the U.S. government changed direction 180 degrees and cut money for loans and grants and simply made public universities free, many highly qualified applicants - especially those from the middle class - would start to pick public universities over selective private schools. I do not believe that Ivy League schools would be hurt much, but other private schools would. They would see the quality of applicants and matriculants especially decline and their reputations suffer, while public universities would see theirs soar. In many countries where public universities are free, private schools have the weaker reputation. In the U.S., the Ivy League schools have so much money and prestige that their position is more or less secure, but flagship public universities and second-tier private schools might swap places in the reputation hierarchy.

An interesting take from Oliver Lee is to starve the system of money and let the most predatory schools collapse.

Conclusion


More or less, colleges have turned their selectivity into their competitive advantage: being hard to get in means their graduates must be desirable employees, and because employers seem to agree, the cycle is only reinforced as the next generation of students apply to elite schools in even greater numbers.

But basing reputation only selectivity is special kind of insanity. We do it only because education quality is hard to assess. There needs to be external verification to make the system fairer for students at every college, so that smart, hard-working students at any institution can get their due. While standardized tests are not perfect, they do help make college admission a bit fairer. Perhaps a dose of the same kind of medicine would help college graduates. I doubt college graduates will ever face a version of A.P. tests, but there is another option: digital learning badges. The idea is simple: any organization can serve as an external validator, certifying discrete skills that can be stacked into broader competencies. The source of the learning - selective college, community college, MOOC, self-taught, on-the-job learning - is irrelevant to the validator. Anyone can review the badge holder's work. If badges were to catch on, of course, graduates of selective schools would do well at acquiring them. But many students from less selective schools would do well, too. Maybe even people taking MOOCs would do well. Badges would have a profoundly democratizing, leveling force in college education because they provide a reliable source of data on what a person actually knows and has learned.

Postscript


In Dr. Pinker's article, I ran across this perfect description of what a good education should accomplish. My only reservation about badges is that it too many people might seek specific competencies and not a broad education as described below.

It seems to me that educated people should know something about the 13-billion-year prehistory of our species and the basic laws governing the physical and living world, including our bodies and brains. They should grasp the timeline of human history from the dawn of agriculture to the present. They should be exposed to the diversity of human cultures, and the major systems of belief and value with which they have made sense of their lives. They should know about the formative events in human history, including the blunders we can hope not to repeat. They should understand the principles behind democratic governance and the rule of law. They should know how to appreciate works of fiction and art as sources of aesthetic pleasure and as impetuses to reflect on the human condition.

On top of this knowledge, a liberal education should make certain habits of rationality second nature. Educated people should be able to express complex ideas in clear writing and speech. They should appreciate that objective knowledge is a precious commodity, and know how to distinguish vetted fact from superstition, rumor, and unexamined conventional wisdom. They should know how to reason logically and statistically, avoiding the fallacies and biases to which the untutored human mind is vulnerable. They should think causally rather than magically, and know what it takes to distinguish causation from correlation and coincidence. They should be acutely aware of human fallibility, most notably their own, and appreciate that people who disagree with them are not stupid or evil. Accordingly, they should appreciate the value of trying to change minds by persuasion rather than intimidation or demagoguery.

More about admissions here and here.

Tuesday, July 22, 2014

College admissions

As a high school teacher, I see the ill-effects of college admissions on students often. Students chose classes that don't interest them and/or they are not academically ready for because of how the classes will look on their applications. Of course, many students do need the push of college admissions to challenge themselves, but more often than not, it comes out in the wrong way: a student who might really enjoy art, who wants to go to art school, but finds it impossible to say "no" to an A.P. Calculus course even though he doesn't really like non-geometrical math much. Also, students push themselves to do far too many extracurriculars.

In simplest terms, it is an arms race. And mostly, it is driven by the desire to get that all-coveted Ivy League (or similar) admission letter.

Of course, this is stressful and harmful for students. But it is also really harmful for the colleges, too.

So extreme are the admission standards now that kids who manage to get into elite colleges have, by definition, never experienced anything but success. The prospect of not being successful terrifies them, disorients them. The cost of falling short, even temporarily, becomes not merely practical, but existential. The result is a violent aversion to risk. You have no margin for error, so you avoid the possibility that you will ever make an error.

From Dr. William Deresiewicz here. My own anecdotal experience agrees with him. I went to a selective school, and while I was there, there was a real sea change in the kind of students who were admitted as the college became even more selective. They might have been more impressive than my class on paper, but they were neurotic and dull in person.

Perhaps one could defend the system by saying that the colleges know what they're doing and select exactly which students they want. Perhaps they don't mind that their students are more neurotic now than in past years. However, as Ph.D. candidate Rob Goodman pointed out here,

Admissions offices have reported that many rejected and admitted applicants are "indistinguishable." For a substantial part of the applicant pool, officers are making essentially random decisions about who gets an acceptance letter. Promoting a narrative that the college admissions process consistently finds the very best and the very brightest, and concealing the inherent chance involved in evaluating these virtually identical candidates, is both wrong and harmful.

The problem is that the top colleges have a surfeit of well-qualified applicants, and the colleges make arbitrary decisions on easily quantified criteria, like the number of extracurriculars. Dr. Deresiewicz proposes that top students avoid the Ivy League altogether. Anyway, the prestige of the Ivy League undergraduate colleges is mostly rubbed off from the quality of the research and the graduate schools, not from the quality of the undergraduate programs themselves. In fact, despite American colleges outsized reputation worldwide, U.S. college graduates as a whole are not that strong on international comparisons. I point this out to note that the link between reputation and quality is often weak. So there's that.

Mr. Goodman proposes something more radical: a lottery. A school gets an initial cut so they can reject unqualified applicants, but all their tentative admits would then go to a second stage, a lottery. As a thought experiment, it is very provocative. But I struggle with why a kid who really, really, really wants to go to U. Chicago for economics might get rejected over a kid from Florida who really hates the thought of the city's winters and would rather be at Emory.

I think part of the problem is that the colleges have less information than the students do. A better system would be a matching algorithm that puts most of the power in the hands of the students. Imagine that each selective college could rank a student into four categories: (A) highly desired (these would most likely be the resume-heads); (B) desired (very academically qualified but with more limited extracurriculars); (C) waitlist (the bubble kids); and (F) reject. Each student would rank the colleges she applied to in order, from most desired to least desired. A matching algorithm could pair the college to the student. This is a well-known problem: the stable marriage problem. Specifically, the National Resident Matching Program, which matches residents to hospitals, currently handles the placements of new doctors. Apparently, the college admission problem is more complicated, although I think some of the difficulty has been that people have assumed a student would be ranked uniformly across all the colleges. Maybe limiting the colleges to only four rankings -- A, B, C, and F -- would help make the problem more tractable. The same method is also used in matching students to high schools in New York City.

I imagine a such system working for the most elite schools in the country, say the top 50 private schools (ranging from 6% to 33% acceptance), as an early decision program. Students would have to meet some quite high G.P.A. and S.A.T. score minima to be considered (basically, 90th percentile or better). Elite colleges could reserve some spots in the regular admission pool, but they could keep these numbers very low to encourage every serious applicant to apply in the early admission matching program. Students who do apply to the match program but don't get in anywhere can apply at the regular time.

Why would this be beneficial? More of the highly qualified applicants would get into their first or second choice programs. The information would mostly come from the students ranking the colleges, not from the college ranking the students. As more students got into their first or second choice programs, anxiety might be damped down. Under the current system, if I want to go to U. Penn., because I know they reject most of their qualified applicants, I will go crazy trying to make sure I'm extra razzle-dazzle awesome. And sadly for me, U. Penn. is not the number one choice for a lot of the applicants. They simply applied because they also have to play the numbers game: apply to a dozen or more schools to have a good chance of being admitted. Everyone is locked into a numbers game, and everyone is locked into an arms race.

One New York Times story pointed out this very fact: the selective colleges haven't really gotten more selective in the last decade; there has simply been application inflation. Some of the application inflation comes from unqualified applicants taking the long shots more often, but most is probably from qualified applicants sending out far more applications than before. In other words, highly qualified applicants have just as good a chance of getting in to a selective college as before, but keeping those odds steady requires sending out a lot more applications now. Other people have taken issue with the specific statistics in the New York Times' story, but I think the overall point is true.

To reiterate: there are about the same number of high school seniors; there are about the same number of highly selective college spots. Therefore, colleges are not getting more selective. It's just that these highly qualified seniors are sending out more applications.

In the current system, each student applies to 8-12 colleges, and the average acceptance rate of the highly selective college is about 18% [my guesstimate based on U.S. News college data]. Once upon a time in the early '90s, each student applied to 4-6 colleges, and the acceptance rate was about 36%.

Under my admission matching program, each student knows that he or she needs to get over a certain threshold (admittedly, very high) to have a very good chance of getting into his or her top one or two colleges. From the students' point of view, the colleges look less "selective" because no longer is there nearly so much noise. And under an admission matching program, elite colleges would have just as many awesome students as before, but the difference would be that more of those students would be expressly excited to be at that particular school.

Update, 24 Jan. 2015: I just finished Mitchell L. Steven's book, Creating a Class: College Admissions and the Education of Elites. He's a sociologist who "embedded" with a college admissions office. It gave me a new perspective on how hard college admissions officers have to work to find and recruit strong applicants. It confirmed for me that, although admissions officers are very sincere and well-meaning, their decision-making truly is limited by a lack of nuanced, reliable information. Of course, they can tell right away which students are not qualified academically, but otherwise, they are making a lot of fine distinctions on what is mostly guesswork.

Update, 7 April 2015: Here's a very similar proposal to mine. Just 8 months after my blog post. Two really good points here:

1. The colleges are suffering because of wildly fluctuating yield rate. A matching system would help alleviate this a lot.

2. Highly qualified low income students really lose out in the current game. Without the coaching or savvy to send out the requisite number of applications, they only take a long shot or two. They significantly hurt their chances to get into a highly selective college.

Update, 7 Nov. 2015: Ben Orlin had a great point about how colleges' (false) pretense of a personalized admission process (when it's a factory process) hurts applicants' feelings. I might add, "Rips out their hearts," but I'm pretty jaded on it.

Update, 22 Dec. 2016: As one thoughtful person said, "College admissions wasn’t designed to send signals about what’s important—to impact what goes on in high school. But it’s become that, and it’s become that without a conscience." And it's worth bearing in mind what Jonathan Cole from my alma mater said:

Cole recalls asking some of his students whether they’d support an admissions system in which a list of potential candidates for the 1,400 or so freshmen seats at Columbia were narrowed down to the best 5,000 applicants, which would then be admitted by lottery. “There’s not a single student who would go for the lottery system. They want to believe that in the sight of God there is a rank order from 1 to 36,000 and they’re among the elect,” Cole said. “They don’t recognize that there are other people who have been rejected for a whole series of reasons who really have as much potential in a variety of ways as they do.” Admission, Cole said, often depends on “which person in the admissions committee reads your application; what their biases are, their presuppositions; whether they’ve had a bad egg-salad sandwich that day or read too many applications. These are all things that enter our decision-making process as human beings. It is [a lottery], but no one is willing to admit it.”

Update, 27 April 2018: Apparently, many of the ideas contained in this blog post would require an anti-trust waiver from the Justice department, which I hadn't considered before.

Update, 28 May 2018: One interesting suggestion is to change admission standards to favor integrated high schools. Read more on my blog about school segregation here.

Update, 31 March 2019: I'm including this article about the mathematical software that runs D.C.'s school choice program. It sounds like the matching program is easy for parents to navigate and manages the school-student selection--and the waitlists--fairly. I think it's particularly relevant to consider what a mess it sounds like D.C.'s school choice program was BEFORE they used the program. The similarities to the college application process are myriad.

Update, 10 May 2019: Another good article on college admissions. And a thoughtful essay about New York's high school admission test.

Update, 18 June 2019: James Fallows, writing in The Atlantic, makes several good points about college admission. Specifically, he makes the point back in 2003 that much of the surge of applications was about students applying to an ever-increasing number of schools:

"One of those fifty-three students applied to twenty-three other colleges. Counselors at upper-end public and private high schools nearly all report an increase in the number of applications each college-bound student submits. At admissions-conscious schools where students in the early 1990s typically applied to five or six colleges, they might now apply to eight, ten, or twelve. In more relaxed settings the average has risen from three or four to six or eight. Counselors consider twenty outrageous—but some say they have seen that and more. "Students have the idea that if they throw more darts at the board, their chances go up," says Carl Ahlgren, the director of college counseling at the Gilman School, a private boys' school in Baltimore. Ahlgren says that in his experience exactly the opposite is true: the more careful and deliberate students are about choosing where to apply, the more likely they are to get in."